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Abstract 
 
With the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), euro-area sovereign 
securities’ adjusted spreads over Germany (corrected from the foreign exchange 
risk) experienced an increase that caused a lower than expected decline in 
borrowing costs. The objective of this paper is to study what explains that rising. 
In particular, if it took place a change in the price assigned by markets to domestic 
(credit risk and/or market liquidity) or to international risk factors. The empirical 
evidence supports the idea that a change in the market value of liquidity  occurred 
with the EMU. International and default risk play a smaller role.  
Keywords: Monetary integration, sovereign securities’ markets,  international 
and domestic credit risk, and  market liquidity. 
JEL Classification Numbers: E44, F36, G15. 
 
Resumen 
 
 
Con el inicio de la Unión Monetaria Europea (UME), los diferenciales ajustados 
de la deuda pública a largo plazo frente a Alemania (corregidos por el riesgo de 
cambio) experimentaron un incremento que ocasionó una disminución inferior a 
la esperada en los costes de endeudamiento. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar 
cuáles son los motives que pudieran explicar la citada alza. En particular, si tuvo 
lugar un cambio en el precio asignado por los mercados a los factores de riesgo 
doméstico (riesgo de crédito y de liquidez) o a los de riesgo internacional. La 
evidencia empírica apoya la idea de que un cambio en la valoración del mercado 
de las diferencias de liquidez ocurrió con el comienzo de la UME. Los factores de 
riesgo de crédito y riesgo internacional parecen desempeñar un papel inferior.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
     Euro-area sovereign securities’ markets experienced important changes with 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) (see Danthine et al. 2001, and the BIS 
Study group on fixed income markets, 2001). Before the introduction of the euro, 
yield differentials within European sovereign borrowers were mostly determined 
by four factors: expectations of exchange rate fluctuations, differences in tax-
regimes among countries, credit risk differences, and market liquidity differences. 
The removal of foreign exchange risk in January 1999 and the elimination (or 
reduction to insignificant levels) of different tax treatments during the course of 
the 90s eliminated two of these factors, and created the conditions for a much 
more integrated and competitive public debt market. 
     Therefore, the main effects of the introduction of the euro in government bond 
markets were, on the one hand, an increase in the degree of substitutability among 
securities issued by different treasuries and a higher  competition between issuers 
to attract investors that fostered some reorganisation of the market structure1. On 
the other, a gain in the importance of credit risk and market liquidity in yield 
differentials. Before Monetary Union differences in these factors were perhaps 
not completely priced due to market segmentation.   
                                                 
1 Blanco (2001) reports that on the side of the issuers, some significant changes were observed 
since the start of the Monetary Union such as the harmonisation of market conventions in the 
computation of yields, the introduction of a single trading calendar and pre-announced 
auction calendars, or the increase in issue sizes. In some countries, the creation of large issues 
was facilitated by the introduction of programmes of exchange of old illiquid bonds for new 
bonds and by the concentration of issuance activity in a smaller number of benchmark 
securities. With the aim to attract more investors, some of the smaller issuers, such as Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal, resorted to syndication procedures. Others, such as 
the French Treasury  introduced new instruments such as constant maturity and inflation-
indexed bonds.  
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     As a result, euro-area government bond markets began to be considered as one 
single market comparable, in terms of size, to the US or Japanese markets. 
Nevertheless, segmentation did not completely disappeared. In 2004, public debt 
management is still decentralized under the responsibility of 12 sovereign issuers, 
with differences in rating, and  characterized by different issuing techniques (see 
Favero, Missale and Piga, 1999). These facts still distinguish euro-area debt 
market from its corresponding US and Japanese counterparts. One evidence of 
this segmentation is the persistence of yield differentials. 
     This persistence motivates the goal of this paper which is to examine what 
happened to euro-area countries’ yield spreads on government bonds after the 
introduction of the euro. The Pre-EMU literature speculated that with the 
elimination of currency risk, yield spreads would narrow and would primarily 
reflect default risk. Conversely, market participants and member state debt 
managers appeared to believe that EMU yield differentials would mostly be due 
to liquidity factors. Therefore, in order to reduce borrowing costs, debt managers 
introduced substantial innovations that should have enhanced the liquidity of their 
bonds.      
     The analysis in this paper will be threefold: First, European yield spreads will 
be decomposed into their two main domestic components (market liquidity and 
credit risk differences) that still remained after the currency risk removal. Second, 
it will be studied if there had been a change in the price assigned by markets to 
them after the introduction of the euro that could explain the observed yield 
spreads behaviour. Third, we will examine the effects of international risk factors 
on yield differentials. The main goal of all this analysis will be to explain which 
could have been the factors behind the observed average increase of 11.98 basis 
points in yield spreads, during the first three years after the start of the Monetary 
Union, once they are corrected from the exchange rate factor (we will follow 
Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1997 and correct pre-EMU spreads by estimating 
 3
the foreign exchange factor as the differential between the 10 years swap rate in 
the currency of denomination of the bond and the 10 years swap rate in Deutsche 
marks) 
     The sample is composed of daily data from January 1996 to December 2001 
(therefore, the same extension, three years, will be considered for both the pre-
EMU and the EMU period) and includes all EMU countries except Luxembourg 
(it has a public debt market that is negligible), and Greece (it did not join the 
Monetary Union until January 2001).   
     We will present the results from two different specifications. In the first 
specification, the objective will be to implement a decomposition between the 
liquidity premium and the credit-risk component of adjusted spreads by modelling 
their behaviour to a number of factors that potentially only affect one of them. It  
will be a static panel estimation that will only include domestic risk factors. The 
credit rating will be used to identify differences in default risk, and both the 
bid/ask spread  (a proxy of market tightness) and relative debt levels (a proxy of 
market depth) will be the variables used to capture market liquidity.  
     Nevertheless, following the short literature on this topic, the analysis will also 
build on findings on the empirical literature on sovereign bond yield spreads on 
emerging markets, according to which spreads are also sensitive to international 
risk factors (mainly US risk factors and interest rates). Therefore, a second 
specification, drawn on Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) will be presented. It 
will be a dynamic model estimated separately for each euro-country (credit risk 
differences will be captured by the relative debt-to-GDP ratio, market liquidity 
differences by both the bid/ask spreads differentials and the on-the run/off-the run 
spreads differentials, and international risk factors by the spread between 10-year 
fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on 10-year US bonds). To the best 
of our knowledge a daily dataset for two of the most important measures of 
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liquidity, the bid/ask spreads and on-the run/off-the run yield differentials, that 
corresponds to the trading activity that takes place in the whole euro-securities’ 
market, has not been used so far in an empirical analysis.   
     The results of both specifications are highly consistent and provide evidence 
that market size scale economies increased with the Currency Union and that the 
rise was higher the smaller (and potentially more illiquid) the debt market was. A 
change in the market assessment of liquidity rather than default or international 
risk factors (which would play a smaller role) might be behind the observed 
increase in adjusted spreads with Monetary Integration, even though the effect 
differs according to the size of the market. Hence, the empirical evidence allows 
to claim that the removal of the exchange rate barrier has penalised small markets. 
In the actual context of increased competition among euro-area government 
securities’ markets, their success might be limited by the extent of their liquidity 
and market size.  
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the foreign 
exchange correction applied in the pre-EMU period. Section 3 outlines some 
evidence concerning Monetary Integration in Europe and the evolution of the 
relative cost of borrowing. Section 4 focuses on the different factors, domestic 
and international, to which adjusted spreads might be sensitive. Section 5 
describes the data. Section 6 explains the models and estimation methodology. 
Section 7 reports the results. Lastly, section 8 draws conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 5
2. Foreign exchange risk correction in the pre-EMU period. 
 
      An appropriate measure of exchange rate changes could be provided by a 
comparison of the yields of government assets denominated in two different 
currencies (say, one in Spanish pesetas, the other in D-marks) and the yields in 
the same currencies with the same life to maturity issued by the same (non-
government) subject, or by two otherwise comparable issuers. Candidates for this 
measure are: (1) long-term bonds issued by the same supra-national organisation 
(such as the World Bank or the European Investment Bank), (2) long-term bonds 
issued by the private sector, and (3) the fixed interest rates on swap contracts . 
     Giovannini and Piga (1994) study the differential between the interest rate on 
an Italian government bond issued in the Eurodollar market and a comparable 
World Bank bond issued in the global market. Alesina et al. (1992) compare 
interest rates on public and private financial instruments denominated in the same 
currencies in 12 OECD countries. And Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997), 
Arnold and Lemmen (2001), Blanco (2001) and Codogno, Favero and Missale 
(2003) compare government bond yield differentials and the interest rate swap 
(IRS) differentials. 
     Supra-national issues are by definition free of any specific default risk. 
However, the market for bonds issued by supra-national organisations is far less 
liquid and deep than that for government bonds. More importantly, supra-national 
issues in some currencies are intermittent. On the other hand, corporate bond 
yields display a quite volatile cyclical behaviour and are not default risk-free. As 
for interest rate swaps, there may be problems also, as they may be affected by the 
emergence of  financial difficulties of the banking sector of one country (see 
Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1997). 
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     However, on balance, the drawbacks of the interest differential on 
supranational issues or corporate issues seem to be greater. Then, even though it 
is not a perfect measure, the spread on fixed interest rate swap contracts can 
therefore be used as an indicator of the exchange rate determinant of the yield 
spread on government bonds as it seems to be the best indicator of this yield 
spread component.  
     Since the early 1980s, interest rate swaps have become one of the most popular 
vehicles utilized by many companies and financial institutions to hedge against 
interest rate risk. An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to 
exchange a series of interest payments without exchanging the underlying debt 
(that is denominated in the same currency), which means that the default risk of 
the underlying asset does not translate into the level of the fixed interest rate on 
the swap contract. In a typical fixed/floating interest rate swap, the first party 
promises to pay to the second at designated intervals a stipulated amount of 
interest calculated at a fixed rate on “the notional principal”. The second party 
promises to pay to the first at the same intervals a floating amount of interest on 
the notional principal calculated according to a floating-rate index2. IRS are 
liquidated by differences, “cash-flow netting”. Essentially, then, an interest rate 
swap is a series of forward contracts on some reference interest rate, such as the 
Libor (see Bicksler and Chen,1986).  
     The fixed rate is the one that is used to price the interest rate swaps3. IRS 
usually present a spread over the on-the run government bond yield at the same 
maturity, and its price basically accounts for the counterparty credit risk, the 
liquidity, the market risk of the swap contract, and the exchange-rate risk of the 
                                                 
2 In this paper, the 6-month money Libor rate (in the respective currency) before the EMU and 
the Euribor after its implementation. 
 
3 I.e. if a 10-year Spanish Peseta IRS is 11.50-11.60, that means that one should pay a 11.60% 
fixed interest rate in exchange of the six-month Spanish Peseta Libor in the euro-market, or 
the six-month Libor in order to receive a 11.50% fixed rate.  
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currency of denomination of the swap. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the 
first three components cancel out when the differential between the 10-year swap 
rate of one European country i over, for example, Germany is taken4. Hence, the 
swap rate differential can be used as an appropriate measure to capture the 
exchange-rate change component of yield spreads. 
     So, let’s denominate: 
Ii,10       =  10-year  Yield on sovereign bonds of country i 
IRSi,10= 10-years Interest Rate Swap rate of currency i  
Where, considering that differences in tax-regimes have been reduced to 
insignificant levels during the course of the 90s: 
Ii,10=f(DRi,10,Li,10,ERi.,10)                                                                                         (1) 
DRi,10 = Default risk of country i 10-year sovereign bonds.  
                                                 
4 With regard to the counterparty credit risk, not only  most of the participants present in the 
different currency segments of the underlying swap market (the euro-deposit market) are the 
same, but also the counterparty credit risk associated to swap rates is currently very low given 
the set of collateralisation and documentation standards recently developed by dealers and 
customers (see Liu, Longstaff and Mandell (2002), Duffie and Singleton (1997)and He (2000)). 
Secondly, market risk derives from the uncertainty associated to the floating leg of the swap 
contract (the six-month Libor rate). However, because market risk is usually highly correlated 
within euro-currencies IRS contracts, it can also be ignored when differentials are taken. 
Finally, with respect to the liquidity of swaps contracts, it is reasonable to assume that, although 
they are currently very liquid (see BIS statistics), their liquidity will be highly correlated with 
the liquidity of the underlying government bonds. Therefore, it may vary within currencies. In 
this case, the estimated foreign exchange component (the swap rate differential)of total yield 
differentials would be biased upward and, consequently, the credit and liquidity component of 
government bonds would be downward biased. However, if we look at the data  (see tables 1) 
we observe an increase in the yield spread in the EMU period for countries in which the swap 
differential was not significant in the pre-EMU period. It is the case of Austria, Belgium, France 
and the Netherlands. This fact  indicates that the aforementioned biases do not fully explain the 
rise in the price of liquidity and credit risk, when yield spreads are corrected for the foreign 
exchange factor and support the utilization of the swap rate differential as an appropriate 
measure to capture the exchange-rate change component of yield spreads. 
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Li,10    = Liquidity of country i 10-year sovereign bonds. 
ERi., 10  = Exchange rate risk of currency i over a 10-year horizon. 
Therefore the 10-year yield differential of country i over Germany will be: 
[Ii,10-IGE,10]t=f([DRi,10-DRGE,10]t,[Li,10-LGE,10]t,[ERi,10-ERGE,10]t)                            (2) 
Then, approximating:  
[IRSi,10-IRSGE,10]t=[ERi,10-ERGE,10]t                                                                        (3) 
The variable “ADJUSTED SPREADit”, i.e. the difference between the total yield 
differential and the swap rate differential, that will be used as the dependant 
variable, will mainly account5 for credit risk and market liquidity differences of 
country i sovereign securities’ over Germany. 
YIELDSPREADit=Ii,10-IGE,10]t=f([DRi,10-DRGE,10]t,[Li,10-LGE,10]t,[ERi,10-ERGE,10]t)(2) 
ADJUSTED SPREADit     = ASPREADit  =  
                                       = [Ii,10 - IGE,10]t –[IRSi,10-IRSGE,10]t = 
                                       =f([DRi,10-DRGE,10]t,[Li,10-LGE,10]t)                                   (4) 
3. Monetary integration and the relative cost of borrowing: Some evidence. 
 
     The aforementioned elimination of two of the main components of yield 
differentials prompted an important convergence in total yield differentials over 
10-year German bond yields during the period January 1999-December 2001. 
This is shown in figure 1 and table 1a: the average spread over German yields 
                                                 
5 We are not considering the effect of international risk factors in this decomposition. 
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decreased from 58.22 to 25.24 basis points. Nevertheless, the convergence only 
implied a sizeable reduction of the relative borrowing costs for the countries that 
used to present wider spreads, lower rating and higher foreign exchange risk. It is 
the case of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser extent of Finland, and Ireland. 
Conversely, the countries that took less advantage of the elimination of the 
exchange rate risk, Austria, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, experienced an 
increase in their relative borrowing costs (15.34, 13.24, 11.08 and 16.92 basis 
points, on average, respectively, see table 1b).  To sum up, while average gross 
yield spreads (relative to Germany) declined since EMU, they rose in 4 of the 9 
countries.  
     Moreover, what is really puzzling is that once adjusted for the swap 
differential (see figure 2), with the Currency Union spreads rose for all 9 
countries. The average value is 25.21 basis points in the EMU period compared 
with 13.23 basis points in the pre-EMU one (see figure 3 and tables 1a and 1b). 
This fact clearly supports the idea that a change in either domestic (market 
liquidity or credit risk values) or international risk factors or in-the-market-pricing 
of them might have occurred with the euro, resulting in higher than the expected 
borrowing costs. The answer to what can explain these rising yield spreads is 
clearly important and will be the main goal of this paper.   
     One possible explanation, which is supported by both market participants and 
member state debt managers beliefs, could be that in the actual context of 
increased competition among euro-area government securities markets their 
success might be limited by the extent of their liquidity and market size. In 
particular, as the German sovereign debt market is the second-biggest market in 
the euro-area (only surpassed by the Italian), a concentration of trading activity in 
the German market might have occurred and, consequently, wider liquidity 
 10
differences vis-à-vis German bonds might have been translated in higher adjusted 
spreads6.  
     More precisely, table 2 shows that, in the European context, while 3 countries, 
Italy, Germany, and France, represented the 71.61 % of the euro-area market, 
another four countries, Austria, Finland, Portugal, and Ireland, only accounted for 
the 5.43 % of the total. Therefore, given (1) these observed large size differences 
among euro-area sovereign debt markets and (2) the fact that, with the removal of 
the foreign exchange risk barrier, captive domestic markets might have tended to 
decrease, it is likely that market size and liquidity differences within markets 
became more important.  
     Some literature supports the importance of market size in the success of a debt 
market. Martin and Rey (2004) show that, in general, size matters for asset trade, 
which means that a larger country will benefit from higher asset prices than a 
smaller one, and point out that these market size effects are reminiscent of the 
home market effect in the new trade and geography literatures (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985). As in the trade literature, they come from the combination of 
imperfect substitution and transaction costs. McCauley and Remolona (2000) note 
that if important fixed costs are involved in the production of information about 
the future path of interest rates, the size of the whole debt market matters. In 
particular, they calculate that there may be a size threshold that lays around $100-
200 billions. Below this level, they state that sustaining a liquid government 
market may not be easy. In the euro-area, only five countries (Italy, Germany, 
France, Spain and Belgium) surpassed that threshold7. Economides and Siow 
(1988) point out, that there might be a trade-off between liquidity and the size of 
                                                 
6 The existence of a very liquid futures bond market in Germany also represents an additional 
advantage of holding German bonds. 
7 Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal present an overall amount of public sector 
outstanding debt below the $100 billion level, while The Netherlands entire amount of 
outstanding public debt is between $100 and $200 billions. 
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the market. The smaller the size of a market, the lower the outstanding volume 
traded in it. Therefore, the more difficult will it be for investors to process and 
evaluate information about securities traded in that market, and the higher the 
transaction costs and the liquidity premium. Moreover, if size matters for 
liquidity, “ex-ante” traders would prefer bigger and liquid markets (they will 
present lower price volatility, bigger scale economies and higher probability of a 
favourable match) rather than small and illiquid markets. Consequently, liquidity 
will be “self-reinforcing”: traders prefer to participate in liquid markets and the 
more traders participate in a market, the more liquid a market will be. This self-
fulfilling nature of liquidity is also outlined by Plantin (2003)8.   
                              
4. Domestic and international risk factors explaining adjusted yield spreads.  
 
     Once the dependent variable (ASPREADit) that allows to separate the liquidity 
and credit risk components from expected exchange-rate depreciation has been 
defined, a decomposition between the liquidity premium and the credit-risk 
component is attempted by modelling their behaviour to a number of factors that 
potentially only affect one of them. This will be the objective of the first 
specification that will be presented, which will only include domestic risk factors. 
It will be a static panel estimation where the credit rating will be used to identify 
differences in default risk, and both the bid/ask spread (a proxy of market 
tightness) and relative debt levels (a proxy of  market depth) will be the variables 
used to control for market liquidity.   
                                                 
8 The central intuition of his model is that liquidity is self-fulfilling because deals creates 
positive externalities by increasing the depth of the secondary market, and thus the price of a 
future resale. 
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     Nevertheless, following the short literature on this topic, the analysis will also 
build on findings on the empirical literature on sovereign bonds spreads on 
emerging markets, according to which spreads are also sensitive to international 
risk factors (mainly US risk factors and interest rates). Therefore, a second 
specification9 will be presented. It will be a dynamic model estimated separately 
for each euro-country (credit risk differences will be captured by relative debt-to-
GDP ratio, market liquidity differences by both the bid/ask spreads differentials 
and the on-the run/off the run spreads differentials, and international risk factors 
by the spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on 
10-year US bonds)10. Then, the results of the two specifications will be compared 
in order to analyse the effects of the introduction of international risk factors in 
the model.  
     With regard to domestic risk factors, a crucial issue in this paper is the 
identification of the two main domestic sources of risk that compose yield spreads 
since the start of Monetary Integration: (1) differences in credit risk and (2) 
differences in market liquidity, which, on the other hand,  are crucial for 
policymaking. 
    Therefore, a first point will be to assess whether EMU has increased credit risk 
by denying governments the emergency exit of money creation and by forbidding 
both the ECB and the EU to bail out troubled governments or if, conversely, the 
maximum threshold that countries have for both their budget deficit and level of 
public indebtedness (resulting in broad improvements in budgetary balances) has 
                                                 
9 Even though the specification is based on  Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003), there are 
some important differences though. First, the models do not control for the same variables. 
Second, their sample period for the daily estimation spans only the 2002 year (which is not 
included in the analysis presented in this paper). Third, their liquidity variables have been 
drawn from MTS, so they only correspond to the trading activity that takes place in that 
electronic platform rather than in the whole euro-securities’ market. Consequently, the results 
can hardly be compared. 
10 A dynamic panel estimation with the same variables has also been estimated but the results 
do not provide relevant information and are not reported in the paper.  
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actually resulted in a decrease in perceived credit risk. With this goal, in the first 
specification the credit rating will be used as a proxy to measure differences in 
credit risk. This variable presents the advantage over other measures, such as the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, that it potentially affects the creditworthiness of the 
governments but not the liquidity of their public debt issues. It then seems the 
right variable to be used in the first specification where the relative level of 
indebtedness is used as a proxy of market depth. Conversely, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio will be used as a proxy to measure differences in credit risk in the second 
specification, where other variables rather than the relative level of indebtedness 
will control for market liquidity. The debt-to-GDP ratio might be a better proxy to 
capture  default risk (ratings present the problem that they might be ex-post 
measures of fiscal sustainability) and it has been broadly used in the literature by 
other authors (Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) among them)11. 
     Secondly, the introduction of the euro reduced some segmentation among 
euro-area government bond markets. The exchange risk removal tumbled an 
important barrier that previously fostered somehow captive domestic markets and 
might partially explain the home bias that existed in cross-border investments in 
the European Union (Adjaouté et al. (2000) document the extent of the home bias, 
both in the bond and in the equities’ markets, for the major European countries --
the UK, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy-- during the period 
1980-1999)12. The increased degree of sovereign securities’ substitutability since 
                                                 
11 In particular, these authors find support for the market discipline hypothesis in the U.S. bond 
markets. This hypothesis assumes that yields rise smoothly at an increasing rate with the level 
of borrowing. However, if these incentives prove ineffective, credit markets will eventually 
respond by denying the irresponsible borrower further access to credit. Nevertheless, the 
model presented in this paper and  Bayoumi et al. model do not control for the same variables 
and cannot be compared. 
12  They document that the United Kingdom held the highest share of foreign assets on total 
financial wealth (24%), whereas Spain had the smallest share of foreign assets (5%), and the 
Netherlands, Germany and Italy had a share of foreign assets around 17%. Moreover, as 
expected, for bill and bonds, the level of diversification was substantial only for banks in the 
UK, France and the Netherlands, i.e. the countries where intermediaries played an important 
role as market-makers in the eurobond markets. These results are consistent with Tesar and 
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the EMU intensified the competition between sovereign issuers to attract 
investors as since then they competed much more closely for the same pool of 
funding. With this more competitive scenario in which the Monetary Union 
resulted, market liquidity differences might have become a more relevant 
component of yield spreads. This is the second point that will be assessed in this 
study.  
     Because market liquidity is an elusive concept, the definition provided by the 
Bank for International Settlements (1999) is presented. They define “a liquid 
market as a market where participants can rapidly execute a large volume of 
transactions with a small impact on prices13”. In the two specifications that will be  
presented, three proxy variables will be used to measure this effect: (i) the bid/ask 
spread (in both of them), (ii) the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt (in 
the first one), and (iii) the on-the run/off-the run spread (in the second).  
     (i) The bid/ask spread:  
     This variable is often used as a measure of liquidity because it reflects the cost 
incurred by a typical investor to unwind an asset position and measures one of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Werner (1995), who present evidence on long-term international investment patterns in 
Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US during the 1970-1990. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the UK led the former sample in international portfolio diversification, with foreign 
security holdings of 32%, compared with 10% in Germany.  
 
13  Likewise, they point out that the usual approach is to consider market liquidity according to 
at least one of three possible dimensions: tightness, depth and resiliency. Tightness is how far 
transaction prices diverge from mid-market prices, and can generally be measured by the 
bid/ask spread. Depth denotes either the volume of trades possible without affecting 
prevailing market prices, or the amount of orders on the order books of market makers at a 
given time. Resiliency refers to the speed with which price fluctuations resulting from trades 
are dissipated, or the speed with which imbalances in order flows are adjusted. However, 
other measures, though they do not directly coincide with these three dimensions, are often 
regarded as readily observable proxies of market liquidity: the number and volume of trades, 
trade frequency, turnover ratio, price volatility, the number of market participants, the yield 
spread between the “on the run” and the “off the run” issues, the outstanding volume of a 
specific security, or the overall outstanding volume of securities traded in one market, among 
them. 
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most important dimensions of liquidity: tightness, i.e. how far transaction prices 
differ from mid-market prices. Additionally, the liquidity of an asset is generally 
understood as the ease of its conversion into money. Therefore, because the 
conversion of an asset into money involves certain costs (searching costs, delays, 
broker’s commissions, etc…), the higher these costs, the lower the degree of 
liquidity. It is important to note that as far as market dealers reduce their liquidity 
risk, the bid/ask spread should narrow with trading activity.  
     (ii) The overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt:  
     The overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt is frequently used as a 
measure of liquidity because big size markets may present low information costs 
because of the fact that their securities are likely to trade frequently and a relative 
large number of investors may own or have analysed their features. It can 
therefore be used as a proxy of market depth14. In this sense,  Inoue (1999) 
outlines that in G10 countries, the larger the outstanding stock of publicly issued 
central government debt, generally the higher the turnover in cash and futures 
trading. And the higher the turnover, the better the liquidity, as measured by the 
bid/ask spread of benchmark 10-year securities. Besides, it does exist a high 
correlation between the size of the overall government debt market and the size of 
the bonds issued by one market.  The bigger  the size of the market the easier to 
offer bond issues of a bigger size. Therefore, as it has not been possible to carry 
out the empirical analysis with real debt issue volume data that exactly match the 
spreads, we will work under the assumption that bond issue volumes are highly 
correlated with the overall government-issuer debt market size. Moreover, some 
literature emphasizes this idea that it might be a trade-off between the size of the 
whole market and its liquidity which, on the other hand, would present a self-
                                                 
14 Bernoth , Von Hagen and Schuknecht (2004) also use the ratio of the total debt of the issuer 
country over the total debt of the EU as a measure of liquidity.  
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fulfilling nature (McCauley and Remolona (2000), Economides and Siow (1988), 
Plantin (2003) or Martin and Rey (2004)). 
     (iii) The on-the run/off-the run spread:  
     The yield spread between more and less liquid securities is also a liquidity 
measure used in the Treasury market (see Fleming, 2003). Since liquidity has 
value, more liquid securities tend to have higher prices (lower yields) than less 
liquid securities. The yield spread is often calculated as the difference between the 
yield of an off-the run (older securities of a given maturity) and that of an on-the 
run (benchmark) security with similar cash-flows characteristics. Positive spreads 
indicate that on-the run securities are trading at a yield discount (or price 
premium) to off-the run securities. This spread provides insight into the value of 
liquidity not provided by other measures.  
     To sum up, the three described variables will be used in our models to control 
for market liquidity and to the best of our knowledge a daily dataset for two of the 
most important measures of liquidity, the bid/ask spreads and on-the run/off-the 
run yield differentials, that corresponds to the trading activity that takes place in 
the whole euro-securities’ market, has not been used so far in an empirical 
analysis. However, for the sake of fairness, it has to be noted that measuring the 
liquidity premium still remains a difficult issue because market liquidity and 
credit risk interact with each other. The lack of liquidity amplifies the effect of 
risk. This is because liquidity variables, such as the bid-ask spread, reflect the risk 
borne by market makers in managing unbalanced positions. As credit risk 
increases so does the risk they face. A (credit-related) flight-to-quality argument 
might also be used to interpret the significance of the on-the run/off-the run 
differentials15. It goes without saying that the relative level of indebtedness can 
also be used as a proxy to control for credit or default risk. In these circumstances, 
                                                 
15 See Vayanos (2004) among others. 
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the results of the analysis should then be taken with some prudence. All the more 
so the empirical evidence qualifies market liquidity rather than default or 
international risk as the main force that might have driven the observed changes 
in adjusted spreads.  
     Lastly, a third point that will be assessed in this paper is the relevance of 
international risk factors on yield spreads. Hence, the analysis will also build on 
the findings of some recent works according to which  yields spreads on eurozone 
government securities are sensitive to international risk factors. Their results are 
in concordance to the empirical literature on sovereign bonds spreads in emerging 
markets which shows that yields on US government bonds/ or the slope of the US 
yield curve are the main determinants of sovereign spreads. The spread between 
10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on 10-year US bonds is the 
variable that will be used to control for global risk. Then, the importance of 
domestic factors (credit risk and market liquidity) will be assessed by testing 
whether the impact of exogenous international factors depends on local fiscal 
fundamentals or market liquidity differences. Even though domestic factors will 
also enter in the model in a linear form. 
 
5. Data description. 
 
     As it has been defined in section 2 the dependent variable is ASPREADit , i.e. 
the difference between the total yield differential of 10-year government bonds 
and the 10-year interest rate swap differential. The sample is composed by daily 
data that span January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2001. Yields and swap rates are 
obtained from Datastream and correspond to the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-
year issue for each market at every moment of time. They are quoted rates at 
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market close. Datastream creates continuous yield series by taking the yield from 
the current benchmark in each market and using this to update a separate time 
series. As a benchmark changes, data are taken from a new stock on the first day 
of the month. Table 4 presents the starting benchmark dates used by Datastream 
as well as the characteristics of the different benchmarks that compose the yield 
and swap series.  
     With regard to the credit rating, a scale (see Blanco 2001) has been calculated 
using both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s ratings that have been obtained from 
Bloomberg  (see table 3)16. 
     With regard to the bid/ask spreads series, daily time-series have been created 
by calculating the spread between the bid and ask quotations provided by 
Bloomberg for the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue for each market at 
every moment of time, using the same benchmarks and starting dates that 
Datastream uses to create the 10-year yields and swap rates series and that are 
indicated in table 4. Bloomberg provides for all the different issues daily quoted 
prices calculated as the average bid and ask quotations at the close. 
     A similar  methodology has been implemented to build the on-the run/off-the 
run spreads daily time-series. These series have been created by calculating the 
differences between the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue and the “off the 
run” (immediately older security) 10-year issue yields provided by Bloomberg for 
                                                 
16 While S&P and Moody’s rate debt using different codes, their rating categories can be 
ordered in comparable levels of risk. For instance, The AAA and AA+ ratings of S&P are 
equivalent, respectively, to the Moody’s Aaa and Aa1 ratings. Taking into account this fact, 
debt has been included in categories 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 if it is equivalently rated by both 
agencies, corresponding respectively, to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth-best rate 
levels. Categories 2, 4, 6 and 8 include debt that is not equivalently rated by these agencies, 
but that only differ by just one level (category 2 includes debt rated in the first level by one 
agency and in the second by the other). And categories 3, 5, 7 and 9 also include debt that is 
not equivalently rated by these agencies, but that differ in two levels (category 3 would 
include debt rated in the first level by one agency and in the third by the other). 
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each market at every moment of time, also using the same benchmarks and 
starting dates that Datastream uses to create the 10-year yields and swap rates 
series (see table 4).  
     The overall outstanding amounts of public debt data have been drawn from the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS; see table 2) and the GDP from Eurostat 
(the Central Statistics Office in the case of Ireland). However, as these series are 
only provided with quarterly frequency, both for the construction of the relative 
level of indebtedness and the relative debt-to-GDP ratio daily time-series, the rest 
of the data  has been extrapolated assuming a daily constant rate of increase of 
those volumes, which on the other hand, present very slight differences within 
countries throughout the studied period. For this reason, it can be assumed that the 
extrapolation will not produce important biases on the data and can be applied in 
this case. 
     And finally, the spread between the 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps 
and the yield on 10-year US bonds, USSPREADit, has been calculated from daily 
data obtained from Datastream.   
     All the variables included in the estimation that capture domestic risk factors 
(i.e., except USSPREADit)  are in relative terms to the German ones, as our 
dependant variable (ASPREADit) is the difference between the total yield 
differential and the swap differential of country i over Germany. Therefore, 
BIDASKDIFit is the difference between the bid/ask spread in country i and the 
bid/ask spread in Germany, ONOFFDIFit  is the difference between the on the run 
/off the run spread in country i and that in Germany, OUTDEBTRATit is the ratio 
of the overall outstanding amount of sovereign debt in country i to the overall 
amount in Germany, LNDEBTGDPit is the (log) deviation of country i debt-to-
GDP ratio from Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio and RATINGDIFit  is the difference 
between the rating scale value of country i  and that of Germany. 
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     The sample spans January 1996 to December 2001. Hence, it has been 
considered the same extension, 3 years, both for the pre-EMU and the EMU 
period. Finally, as previously indicated, all the EMU countries except 
Luxembourg and Greece have been included in the estimations, thus the analysis 
will include 9 countries or groups.   
 
6. Modelling adjusted yield spreads behaviour. 
6.1. Static panel model with domestic risk factors.   
 
     As in our earlier paper (Gómez-Puig, 2003), the first specification will only 
include variables controlling for domestic risk factors. The main objective of this 
analysis will be to study if there had been a change in the price assigned by 
markets to the two main sources of domestic risk (credit risk and/ or market 
liquidity) since the beginning of the Currency Union that could explain the 
observed adjusted yield spreads rise. Therefore, this specification will be a static 
panel estimation where, in addition to the variables already mentioned, country 
dummy variables and monthly dummy variables will be introduced, in order to 
capture the potential existence of both specific features by countries and temporal 
effects. With regard to temporal effects they could actually be the consequence of 
the existence of exogenous or international risk factors which have not been 
introduced directly in the model. Besides, as the goal is to analyse if the marginal 
effect of the different variables varies with the beginning of the EMU, it will also 
be introduced a dummy (DPRE) that takes the value 1 in the pre-EMU period 
(and 0, otherwise), and  the coefficients of the interactions between this dummy 
and the rest of variables will be calculated. Finally, in order to assess if there 
exists a varying relationship between the relative debt levels and the yield 
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ASPREADSit (if liquidity is self-fulfilling, relative indebtedness levels and yield 
spreads might present a negative non-linear relationship, i.e. a bigger market 
might lead to an increasingly lower liquidity premium) a quadratic specification 
for the variable OUTDEBTRATit.17 will be formulated.  
     Therefore the estimated model will be: 
yit=αi+βXi+γDPREit+δMONTHLYDUMMIESt+λCOUNTRYDUMMIESi+εit       (5) 
where previously defined:  
OUTDEBTRAT2it= (OUTDEBTRATit)2   
the independent variables vector will be: 
Xit=(BIDASKDIFit,OUTDEBTRATit,OUTDEBTRAT2it, RATINGDIFit:)18           (6) 
In addition,  
β=β1+β2DPREit                                                                                                      (7) 
therefore, the marginal effect of a variable will be: 
β = β1 (in the EMU period), and  
β = β1 + β2 (in the pre-EMU) 
 
                                                 
17 The model has also been estimated with a cubic formulation. However, the estimated 
coefficients for this variable were not significant in the EMU period and very small in the pre-
EMU. For this reason, they are not presented in the paper. 
18 In the case of the variable RATINGDIFit, because the numerical values that have been 
assigned to the agencies’ ratings are arbitraries, the model has also been estimated with some 
transformations of this variable: a quadratic, a square root, a logarithm, and an exponential 
form. However, the results were very similar in all cases. 
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6.2. Dynamic regression models with both domestic and international 
factors. 
 
     The second specification will present several differences compared to the 
previous one. Firstly, as some aspects of both credit risk and market liquidity do 
not change over the period considered, the objective will be to identify the relative 
importance of liquidity and default premiums in explaining fluctuations, rather 
than levels of yield differentials. With this aim a lag of the dependent variable 
will be introduced in the model, which will allow for a slow dynamic adjustment 
to a long-term equilibrium value of the variable ASPREADit. Secondly, this 
specification will control for both international and domestic risk factors. Lastly, 
it will be implemented separately for each one of the  9 euro participating 
countries that are included in the sample.   
     The international risk variable that allows adjusted spreads to be explained in 
terms of exogenous risk premiums (specifically, banking risk premiums in the 
United States), USSPREADit, appears in the regression both linearly, and 
interacted with the domestic risk variables: LNDEBTGDPit, ONOFFDIFit and  
BIDASKDIFit. This captures the idea that international risk affects adjusted yield 
differentials because Eurozone government bonds are imperfect substitutes, either 
because of differences in market liquidity or in default risk. Therefore, the 
interaction term identifies changes in adjusted spreads that can be entirely 
attributed to domestic risk differentials. However, the linear term is also 
necessary, as international factors might affect the adjusted yield spread either 
because of “structural” differences in market liquidity or differences in non-
varying unobservable fundamentals, such as the reputation of the issuing 
governments.  
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     On the other hand, the independent effect of domestic risk variables on 
adjusted spreads is also controlled by entering these variables (LNDEBTGDPit, 
ONOFFDIFit and BIDASKDIFit) linearly in the regressions.   
     Finally, as in the previous specification, in order to analyse if the marginal 
effect of the different variables varies with the start of the EMU, it will also be 
introduced a dummy (DPRE) that takes the value 1 in the pre-EMU period (and 0, 
otherwise), and  the coefficients of the interactions between this dummy and the 
rest of variables will be calculated. 
     Therefore, the following empirical model on daily data will be implemented 
separately for each of the 9 countries that compose the sample: 
yit=αi+βXit+γDPREit+εit                                                                                                 (8) 
where previously defined the international (IRVit) and domestic risk variables 
(DRVit,):  
IRVit=USSPREADit                                                                                                 (9) 
DRVit,=LNDEBTGDPit,ONOFFDIFit  and  BIDASKDIFit                                   (10) 
the independent variables vector will be: 
 Xit=(yit-1,IRVit,DRVit,DRVit*IRVit)                                                                        (11)         
In addition,  
β=β1+β2DPREit                                                                                                      (7) 
hence, the marginal effect of a variable will be: 
β = β1 (in the EMU period), and  β = β1 + β2 (in the pre-EMU) 
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7. Results. 
 
     The estimation methods used in both specifications, Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS) in the static panel estimation and a regression with Newey-
West standard errors in the dynamic estimations for each euro-country, are robust 
to the possible existence of autocorrelation and heterocedasticity in the error 
terms.  
     The results of both specifications are highly consistent and provide evidence 
that market size scale economies might have increased with the Currency Union 
and that this increase might be higher the smaller (and potentially more illiquid) 
the debt market is. A change in the market assessment of liquidity rather than 
default or international risk might be behind the observed increase in adjusted 
spreads with Monetary Integration, even though the effect differs according to the 
size of the market.   
     Tables 5 and 6 present respectively the values and standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients that correspond to the first and second specification. For 
each exogenous variable, these tables display the corresponding marginal effects 
for the  EMU period (β1) and the pre-EMU (β1+ β2) that have been calculated 
from the estimated coefficient values. 
     In particular, table 5 presents the results for the static panel estimation that 
only accounts for domestic risk factors.  Because of their extension, the 
coefficients of the monthly dummy variables are not presented, although they are 
significant except for the periods: Feb-96, Apr-99, Dec-99/Jan-00, and Dec-01. 
These results support the idea of a possible omission in the model of a common 
exogenous variable (a international/ global risk variable, for instance) to which 
adjusted spreads might be sensitive. With regard to the country dummies, as it is 
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shown, they are all significant at the 5 percent confidence level except in the case 
of Austria (where it is significant at the 10 percent though). Therefore, specific 
factors in every different country are relevant, which means that a separate 
estimation for each of them (as it will be implemented in the second specification) 
might provide wider information.   
     The main conclusions that can be drawn from table 5 are that a change in the 
market assessment of liquidity measured by both the bid/ask spreads and relative 
market size levels, rather than credit risk, could be the factor behind the adjusted 
spreads rise in the EMU period. In particular, the results support the existence of a 
positive relationship in the case of the bid/ask spreads and a negative non-linear 
relationship between relative debt levels and adjusted spreads. In both cases, the 
marginal effect has been accentuated with the EMU. 
     More precisely, even though the results support the idea that government 
securities adjusted yield differentials do carry a credit risk premium to 
compensate investors for bearing default risk, it does not increase with the 
Monetary Integration. Conversely, with regard to the variables that capture 
market liquidity, the bid/ ask spread  marginal impact is not only positively 
significant in both periods, but it also rises in the EMU period. In the case of the 
relative level of indebtedness, the results do support the existence of a negative 
non-linear relationship in both periods. Adjusted spreads decrease at an increasing 
rate with market size, i.e. a bigger market leads to an increasingly lower liquidity 
premium (which would be consistent with the self-fulfilling theory about market 
liquidity). Moreover, the negative marginal impact of relative debt level on 
adjusted spreads rises in absolute terms with the Currency Union, even though 
this increase is bigger the smaller (and potentially more illiquid) the market is. 
Therefore, especially for small markets, market size scale economies seem to 
have risen with the Monetary Union. Actually, after January 1999 (see figure 3 
and table 1b) the adjusted spread over 10-year German bonds has increased in all 
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countries (the average increase was 11.98 basis points), and table 2 shows that 
with an average market share of 22.05%, the German market is the second biggest 
in the euro-area, surpassed only by the Italian. Hence, an improvement of relative 
German market liquidity might be behind the adjusted spreads changes. In fact, 
the countries with a larger debt market relative to Germany (Italy, France and 
Spain) are the ones that have experienced the lowest rise in their adjusted spread 
with the introduction of the euro (see table 1b)19. Actually, other authors as 
Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht (2004) also outline that after the start of 
EMU it can be observed that German government bond yields are still below 
those of bonds issued by governments with much better debt positions. In their 
opinion, the fact that German bonds enjoy a yield advantage compared to others 
may be due to the size of the German bond market and the fact that German 
bonds can be traded immediately at lower transaction costs and with a smaller risk 
of price changes due to individual transactions20, which seems to support our 
conclusions. 
     On the other hand, with regard to the dynamic specification including both 
international and domestic risk variables, the results presented in table 6 show that 
the introduction of global risk variables in the model do not change the leading 
role of market liquidity in explaining adjusted spreads changes. It is important to 
note though that, default risk marginal impact (both in the linear form or when it 
is interacted with international risk) increases in some countries in the EMU 
period. However, it is puzzling that the rise occurs in countries that do not have a 
specially high debt-to GDP ratio but that do have a small-size debt market (the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal). 
                                                 
19 According to these results market liquidity rather than relative supply might be the force that 
drives the relationship between relative indebtedness levels and adjusted spreads in the euro-
area countries. 
20 In addition, these authors also conclude that countries whose national debt has a larger share 
in total EU debt pay lower interest rates than EU countries with smaller shares. 
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     In particular, the main conclusions of the second specification are a general 
higher significance of the different variables in the countries with a smaller debt 
market size. This would be consistent with the results of the previous 
specification according to which the increase in market size scale economies with 
the Monetary Union are bigger the smaller the debt market is. Besides, it would 
also be in concordance with the fact that the three countries that account for 
around the 70% of the euro-area government securities markets (Italy, France and 
Spain) are precisely the ones that have experienced the lowest adjusted spread rise 
with the Monetary Integration. In this sense, the removal of the exchange rate 
barrier would have penalised small countries, which have been forced to compete 
with major in terms of liquidity, having to offer only bond issues of a smallest 
size. On the other hand, even though they are relevant, international risk factors 
appear less significant than local risk factors in explaining adjusted spreads 
changes. In addition, default risk only seems to be relevant when it is 
accompanied by a small market size. In this sense, in Italy, although its very high 
debt-to-GDP ratio, the associated default risk might be compensated by the 
increased liquidity that a big market supposes. Therefore, the relevance of market 
liquidity indicators and, in particular, the importance of  market size in the 
explanatory power degree of the different risk variables is reinforced with these 
results. All the countries that present an increase in the marginal impact of one of 
the market liquidity proxies in the EMU period have small-size government debt 
markets. It is the case of the Netherlands or Ireland where the marginal effect of 
the bid/ ask spread (the most straight measure of liquidity) has increased, or of 
Austria and Finland (where the on the run/off the run spread marginal impact has 
risen with the Currency Union).  
     In particular, from the second specification the following facts are worthy of 
remark. Firstly, a substantial decrease in the significance of the lag dependent 
variable (which captures the structural aspects of both credit risk and market 
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liquidity) in the EMU period, except in countries that present a high debt-to-GDP 
ratio relative to Germany. Actually, the effect remains unchanged in the case of 
Belgium and Ireland, while it rises for Spain and Italy. Therefore, with the 
Currency Union, adjusted spreads are, in general, less sensitive to structural 
differences in market liquidity or credit risk, except in the countries (but 
Ireland21) where there are more chances that debt sustainability becomes a 
problem. With regard to the international risk variable, it turns out to be 
significant only in the case of the smallest debt markets (the potentially more 
illiquid markets, see McCauley and Remolona, 2000): Austria, Finland, Ireland 
and the Netherlands. Moreover, in the case of the smallest market, Ireland, the 
significance has increased. In the three other countries, even though still 
significant, its significance has decreased with the Currency Union. These facts 
might imply that the smaller the market the more sensitive it is to global risk 
factors, even though, in general, the explanatory power of international risk 
factors has decreased with the Monetary Integration. We should then look at 
domestic risk variables in order to find the reasons behind the adjusted spreads 
rise observed with the EMU. 
     Hence, secondly, with regard to the relative debt-to-GDP variable (a proxy of 
default risk), it is not significant in the EMU period for the countries with the 
higher relative debt ratio: Belgium, Italy, France, Austria and Spain. These 
markets (but Austria) also have a big market size relative to Germany. For the 
four other countries, the significance has remained unchanged in the case of 
Finland, whereas it has decreased in the case of Ireland and the Netherlands. Only 
in the case of Portugal the marginal effect increases with the EMU (with a 10 
percent confidence level though). For the variables that control for  market 
liquidity, the following results have been obtained. The relative spread between 
                                                 
21 It is important to remark that the results obtained for Ireland must be taken with prudence 
because for this country the number of available observations is substantially smaller than for 
the rest of the countries.  
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the on-the run and the off-the run yields only presents a positive marginal effect 
on adjusted spreads in the EMU period in the case of Finland and Austria (both of 
them are small-size debt markets), which has also increased compared to the pre-
EMU. Finally, in the case of the bid-ask spread, it presents a positive marginal 
effect in the EMU period for Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Portugal. Again, except in the case of Belgium, all of them are small-size debt 
markets. Moreover the significance of this variable has increased with the 
Currency Union in Ireland and the Netherlands.  
     Thirdly, with regard to the interaction between the international risk variable 
and the domestic ones (which should identify changes in adjusted yield spreads 
entirely attributed to differences in default risk or market liquidity), in the case of 
the interaction with the default risk variable, the marginal effect is significantly 
positive in the EMU period for Austria, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands (at 
the 10 percent confidence level it is also significant for France). Besides, in 
Ireland and the Netherlands the effect has risen compared with the pre-EMU 
period. Nevertheless, with respect to the interaction with the market liquidity 
variables, the marginal effect is significant in some countries, even though always 
with the wrong sign.  
     To conclude, the constant (that should capture other factors affecting adjusted 
yield spreads fluctuations) is only significant at the 5 percent confidence level in 
the case of Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. Again, the four 
countries (but the Netherlands) present a debt-to-GDP ratio lower than Germany 
and a small-size debt market.  
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8. Conclusions.  
 
     Euro-area countries’ adjusted spreads over 10-yr German securities 
experienced an average rise of 11.98 basis points in the first three years after the 
beginning of the Monetary Union. This fact resulted in a decrease lower than the 
expected in the costs of borrowing (they actually increased in the case of Austria, 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands). Therefore, either a change in domestic 
(market liquidity and/or credit risk) or international risk factors or in the market 
pricing of them might have occurred with the EMU.  
     The results of both specifications are highly consistent and provide evidence 
that market size scale economies seem to have increased with the Currency Union 
and that this rise is higher the smaller (and potentially more illiquid) the debt 
market is. In the first specification, the evidence supports the idea that a change in 
the market assessment of liquidity measured by both the bid/ask spreads and the 
relative market size levels, rather than credit risk, could be the factor behind the 
adjusted spreads increase in the EMU period. In particular, the results support the 
existence of a positive relationship in the case of the bid/ask spreads and a 
negative non-linear relationship between relative debt levels and adjusted spreads. 
In both cases, the marginal effect has been accentuated with the EMU. 
     In the second specification, the empirical evidence also shows, in general, a 
higher significance of the different variables in the EMU period for the countries 
with a smaller debt market size. For instance, default risk marginal impact  
increases in some countries in the EMU period, but which is puzzling is that the 
rise occurs in countries that do not have a specially high debt-to GDP ratio but 
that do have a small-size debt market: Portugal, the Netherlands and Ireland. The 
latter two countries are precisely the ones that also experience a rise in the 
marginal effect of the bid/ask spread with the EMU, whereas in the case of the 
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other variable that controls for market liquidity, the on-the run/ off-the run spread, 
its marginal impact only increases in another two small-size debt markets: Austria 
and Finland. In this same vein, international risk factors are only significant for 
the smaller debt markets, although their marginal effect do not increase with the 
common currency (but for Ireland). 
     Then, even with this necessary caution taken into account the difficulty in 
measuring liquidity premium because its interaction with credit risk, this 
empirical evidence, which, on the other hand, is supported by both market 
participants and member state debt managers beliefs, allows us to claim that the 
removal of the exchange rate barrier might have implied a change in the market 
assessment of liquidity rather than default or international risk factors (which only 
seem to play a smaller role). These facts might be behind the observed increase in 
adjusted spreads with Monetary Integration. Although the rise differs according to 
the size of the market. In particular, as the German sovereign debt market is the 
second-biggest market in the euro-area (only surpassed by the Italian), a 
concentration of trading activity in the German market might have occurred and, 
consequently, wider liquidity differences vis-à-vis German bonds might have 
been translated in higher adjusted spreads. Actually, the countries with a larger 
debt market relative to Germany (Italy, France and Spain) are the ones that have 
experienced the lowest increase in their adjusted spread with the introduction of 
the euro (see table 1b). To conclude, in the actual context of higher competition 
among euro-area government securities’ markets, small-size markets might have 
been penalised as they now compete much more closely with major markets for 
the same pool of funding. Therefore, with the introduction of a common currency, 
euro-area sovereign securities’ debt markets success might be limited by the 
extent of their liquidity and market size.  
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FIGURE 1  
NOTE:  Yield differential = (Ii – IDM), where Ii is the 10-year yield on country i government 
bonds and IDM is the 10-year yield on Germany government bonds. 
Source : Datastream 
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 FIGURE 2   
 
NOTE: Swap differential = (IRSi – IRSDM), where IRSi is the 10-year interest rate swap of 
currency i and IRSDM  is the 10-year interest rate swap of  the D-mark. 
Source :Datastream 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Adjusted  yield spread = Yield differential – Swap differential = (Ii - IDM) – (IRSi – 
IRSDM). Source: Datastream. 
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                       TABLE 1a      
 
PRE-EMU (1996-1998) EMU (1999-2001)
(Ii-IDM) (IRSi-IRSDM) ASPREADi (Ii-IDM) (IRSi-IRSDM) ASPREADi
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)-(5)
AT 9.07 -0.33 9.40 24.42 -0.01 24.43
BE 33.06 4.29 28.77 46.30 -0.01 46.31
FI 43.56 41.31 2.25 21.95 -0.01 21.96
FR 2.97 -3.10 6.07 14.05 0.00 14.05
IE 50.52 43.84 6.68 14.78 0.00 14.78
IT 157.73 133.04 24.69 32.32 0.05 32.27
NL -2.70 -3.52 0.83 14.22 -0.01 14.23
PT 111.73 91.42 20.31 31.85 0.22 31.63
SP 118.06 97.99 20.07 27.24 0.04 27.20
Average 58.22 44.99 13.23 25.24 0.03 25.21
St.dev. 57.48 51.37 10.33 10.66 0.08 10.64
                                                   
 
 
    TABLE 1b 
Differences between EMU and pre-EMU
(ii-iDM) ASPREADi
(4)-(1) (6)-(3)
AT 15.34 15.03
BE 13.24 17.53
FI -21.61 19.71
FR 11.08 7.98
IE -35.74 8.10
IT -125.40 7.58
NL 16.92 13.40
PT -79.88 11.31
SP -90.82 7.13
Average -32.99 11.98
St.dev. 53.77 4.69
 
 
 
NOTE: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The 
Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SP: Spain. Source: Datastream.  
(Ii- IDM) = 10-year yield difference over Germany 
(IRSi – IRSDM) = 10-year interest rate swap difference over Germany 
ASPREADi = (Ii- IDM) - (IRSi – IRSDM) 
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TABLE 2 
 
ource: Bank for International Settlements. 
                       TABLE 3 
man, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, 
DOMESTIC DEBT SECURITIES 
PUBLIC SECTOR AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING
(Billions of euros)
  1995-12   1996-12   1997-12  1998-12  1999-12  2000-12 2001-12 average % over EMU
     Ireland 19.93 23.20 23.12 21.93 24.73 24.07 19.95 23.15 0.69
     Portugal 35.19 36.47 32.84 34.04 37.49 42.35 45.61 37.67 1.13
     Finland 33.20 38.15 41.56 44.28 45.60 47.70 46.28 43.39 1.30
     Austria 57.04 58.95 63.87 69.28 86.05 99.74 100.52 76.80 2.30
     Greece 64.10 79.58 84.47 84.80 88.43 96.73 102.20 87.23 2.62
     Netherlands 155.64 159.89 159.68 170.12 178.14 180.98 177.50 171.44 5.14
     Belgium 228.86 230.59 228.41 229.67 231.85 246.18 248.66 236.75 7.10
     Spain 211.07 241.63 259.63 272.41 287.34 311.04 299.43 269.56 8.09
     France 497.35 536.05 565.50 623.91 639.85 708.45 709.23 614.79 18.45
     Germany 676.53 682.74 699.45 738.75 767.35 816.77 790.81 734.97 22.05
     Italy 896.49 1022.19 1011.08 1037.09 1042.62 1088.36 1056.96 1036.69 31.11
     EMU 2875.40 3109.45 3169.63 3326.27 3429.43 3662.37 3597.15 3332.43 100.00
S
                                    
  
   
Rating
S&P Moody's Scale
AAA Aaa 1
AAA Aa1 2
AA+ Aaa 2
AAA Aa2 3
AA+ Aa1 3
AA Aaa 3
AA+ Aa2 4
AA Aa1 4
AA+ Aa3 5
AA Aa2 5
AA- Aa1 5
AA Aa3 6
AA- Aa2 6
AA A1 7
AA- Aa3 7
A+ Aa2 7
AA- A1 8
A+ Aa3 8
AA- A2 9
A+ A1 9
A Aa3 9
NOTE: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, GE: Ger
NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SP: Spain. Source: Bloomberg for S&P and Moody’s 
Ratings. Rating scale inspired in Blanco (2001).  
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TABLE 4 
                             
Starting date as a benchmark Name Coupon Maturity date
AUSTRIA
Dec-95 OESTERREICH 1995 6.5% 17/11/05
Mar-96 OESTERREICH 1996 6.125% 09/02/06
Jul-96 OESTERREICH 1996 6.25% 31/05/06
Nov-96 OESTERREICH 1996 5.875% 15/07/06
Feb-97 OESTERREICH 1997 5.625% 17/01/07
Jun-97 OESTERREICH 1997 5 3/4% 11/04/07
Sep-97 OESTERREICH 1997 5 5/8% 15/07/07
Feb-98 OESTERREICH 1998 5% 15/01/08
Apr-99 OESTERREICH 1999 4% 15/07/09
Dec-99 OESTERREICH 1999 5 1/2% 15/01/10
May-01 OESTERREICH 2001 5 1/4% 04/01/11
BELGIUM
Feb-95 BELGIUM OLO 1994 6.5% 31/03/05
Mar-96 BELGIUM OLO 1995 7% 15/05/06
Jan-97 BELGIUM OLO 1996 6 1/4% 28/03/07
Dec-97 BELGIUM OLO 1997 5 3/4% 28/03/08
Feb-99 BELGIUM OLO 1999 3 3/4% 28/03/09
Feb-00 BELGIUM OLO 2000 5 3/4% 28/09/10
May-01 BELGIUM OLO 2001 5% 28/09/11
FINLAND
Jul-93 FINLAND 1993 9 1/2% 15/03/04
Sep-96 FINLAND 1996 7 1/4% 18/04/06
Dec-97 FINLAND 1997 6% 25/04/08
Dec-98 FINLAND 1998 5% 25/04/09
Feb-00 FINLAND 2000 5 3/4% 23/02/11
FRANCE
Aug-95 OAT FRANCE 1995 7 3/4% 25/10/05
Feb-96 OAT FRANCE 1995 7.25% 25/04/06
Oct-96 OAT FRANCE 1995 6.50% 25/10/06
Apr-97 OAT FRANCE 1996 5.5% 25/04/07
Oct-97 OAT FRANCE 1997 5.5% 25/10/07
Mar-98 OAT FRANCE 1998 5.25% 25/04/08
Nov-98 OAT FRANCE 1998 8.5% 25/10/08
Jan-99 OAT FRANCE 1998 4% 25/04/09
Jul-99 OAT FRANCE 1999 4% 25/10/09
Mar-00 OAT FRANCE 2000 5.5% 25/04/10
Sep-00 OAT FRANCE 2000 5.5% 25/10/10
Jun-01 OAT FRANCE 2001 6.5% 25/04/01
GERMANY
Nov-95 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1995 6 1/2% 14/10/05
Feb-96 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1996 6% 05/01/06
Mar-96 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1996 6% 16/02/06
Jun-96 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1996 6 1/4% 26/04/06
Feb-97 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1997 6% 04/01/07
May-97 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1997 6% 04/07/07
Feb-98 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1998 5 1/4% 04/01/08
Aug-98 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1998 4 3/4% 04/07/08
Feb-99 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1999 3 3/4% 04/01/09
Apr-99 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1999 4% 04/07/09
Aug-99 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1999 4 1/2% 04/07/09
Nov-99 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 1999 5 3/8% 04/01/10
Jun-00 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 2000 5 1/4% 04/07/10
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Dec-00 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 2000 5 1/4% 04/01/11
Jun-01 BUNDESREPUB.DTL 2001 5% 04/07/11
TABLE 4 (Continuation) 
IRELAND
Jun-95 IRISH TRSY. 8% 18/08/06
Oct-97 IRISH TRSY. 6% 18/08/08
Jul-99 IRISH TRSY. 4% 18/04/10
ITALY
Sep-95 BTP ITALY 1996 10 1/2% 01/09/05
Jun-96 BTP ITALY 1996 9 1/2% 01/02/06
Nov-96 BTP ITALY 1996 8 3/4% 01/07/06
Feb-97 BTP ITALY 1997 6 3/4% 01/02/07
Oct-97 BTP ITALY 1997 6 3/4% 01/07/07
Feb-98 BTP ITALY 1997 6% 01/11/07
Jul-98 BTP ITALY 1998 5% 01/05/08
Jan-99 BTP ITALY 1998 4 1/2% 01/05/09
Oct-99 BTP ITALY 1999 4 1/4% 01/11/09
Jul-00 BTP ITALY 2000 5 1/2% 01/11/10
Jun-01 BTP ITALY 2001 5 1/4% 01/08/11
NETHERLANDS
Dec-95 NEDERLAND 1995 6 3/4% 15/11/05
Feb-96 NEDERLAND 1995 6% 15/01/06
Feb-97 NEDERLAND 1997 5 3/4% 15/02/07
Feb-98 NEDERLAND 1998 5 1/4% 15/07/08
Feb-99 NEDERLAND 1999 3 3/4% 15/07/09
Feb-00 NEDERLAND 2000 5 1/2% 15/07/10
Apr-01 NEDERLAND 2001 5% 15/07/11
PORTUGAL
Mar-95 PORTUGAL OT 1995 11 7/8% 23/02/05
Jul-96 PORTUGAL OT 1996 9.5% 23/02/06
Mar-97 PORTUGAL OT 1997 6.625% 23/02/07
Jun-98 PORTUGAL OT 1998 5 3/8% 23/06/08
Jul-99 PORTUGAL OT 1999 3.95% 15/07/09
Jun-00 PORTUGAL OT 2000 5.85% 20/05/10
Apr-01 PORTUGAL OT 2001 5.15% 15/06/11
SPAIN
Dec-95 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1995 10.15% 31/01/06
Oct-96 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1996 8.8% 30/04/06
Feb-97 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1996 7.35% 31/03/07
Nov-97 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1997 6% 31/01/08
Jan-99 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1998 5.15% 30/07/09
Jan-00 OBLIGACION ESTADO 1999 4.0% 31/01/10
Feb-01 OBLIGACION ESTADO 2000 5.4% 30/07/11
Oct-01 OBLIGACION ESTADO 2001 5.35% 31/10/11
Source: Datastream 
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                   TABLE 5 
Cross-Sectional Time-Serie FGLS Regression, with country dummies
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12
                       EMU: 1999:01-2001:12
dependent variable: ASPREAD
EMU COUNTRIES
ß 1 (X it ) ß 2 (DPRE it *X it ) ß 1 + ß 2 
X it ß(EMU) ß(preEMU)
BIDASKDIF it 0.167** -0.064** 0.103**
(0.020) (0.024)
OUTDEBTRAT it -0.320** 0.096** -0.225**
(0.059) (0.012)
OUTDEBTRAT2 it -0.130** -0.024** -0.154**
(0.038) (0.009)
RATINGDIF it 0.014** 0.005** 0.019**
(0.002) (0.001)
λ i 
DAUSTRIA 0.014*
(0.008)
DBELGIUM 0.109**
(0.014)
DFINLAND -0.065**
(0.005)
DFRANCE 0.246**
(0.026)
DIRELAND -0.107**
(0.006)
DITALY 0.688**
(0.037)
DNETHERLANDS -0.037**
(0.012)
DSPAIN 0.110**
(0.015)
γ    
DPRE it -0.045**
(0.006)
α
CONSTANT 0.230**
(0.009)
Number of observations = 12928
Number of groups = 9
Avg obs per group = 1440.56
Log likelihood = 25386.52
Wald chi2 = 50894.2
Prob > chi2 = 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
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TABLE 6 
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12
                       EMU: 1999:01-2001:12
dependent variable: ASPREAD
AUSTRIA BELGIUM FINLAND
ß 1 (X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
t ) ß 2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß 1 + ß 2 ß 1 (Xt ) ß 2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß 1 + ß 2 ß 1 (Xt ) ß 2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß 1 + ß 2 
Xt ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU) ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU) ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU)
ASPREADt-1 0.620** 0.208** 0.828** 0.713** -0.050 0.713** 0.508** 0.292** 0.800**
(0.043) (0.054) (0.029) (0.053) (0.039) (0.050)
USSPREADt 0.060** 0.110** 0.170** 0.137 0.770 - 0.040** 0.173** 0.213**
(0.025) (0.048) (0.371) (0.624) (0.019) (0.081)
LNDEBTGDPt -0.103 -0.693** -0.693** -0.068 0.299 - -0.471** 0.398 -0.471**
(0.109) (0.274) (0.363) (0.437) (0.168) (1.326)
ONOFFDIFt 0.407* -0.424* -0.017* -0.145 0.101 - 0.475** -0.399** 0.076**
(0.221) (0.262) (0.209) (0.251) (0.162) (0.183)
BIDASKDIFt 0.485* -0.430 0.485* 0.540** 0.324 0.540** 0.261 0.261 -
(0.268) (0.401) (0.198) (0.500) (0.170) (0.170)
LNDEBTGDPt *USSPREADt 0.293** 1.244** 1.538** -0.087 -0.714 - 0.614** 0.234 0.614**
(0.132) (0.529) (0.399) (0.641) (0.203) (3.023)
ONOFFDIFt *USSPREADt -0.543** 0.733* 0.190* 0.026 -0.410 - -0.702** 0.234 -0.702**
(0.236) (0.440) (0.229) (0.375) (0.184) (3.022)
BIDASKDIFt *USSPREADt -0.596** 0.420 -0.596** -0.695** -0.678 -0.695** -0.287* 0.641** 0.354*
(0.297) (0.761) (0.229) (1.063) (0.160) (0.269)
γ γ γ 
DPREt -0.094** -0.324 -0.166**
(0.029) (0.418) (0.040)
α α α
CONSTANT 0.018 0.108 0.083**
(0.019) (0.339) (0.020)
Number of obs 1481 1491 1311
F = F(17,1463) = 1813.43  F(17,1473) = 1333.43 F(17,1293) = 422.05
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
 44
TABLE 6 (Continuation) 
 
FRANCE IRELAND ITALY
ß 1 (Xt ) ß 2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß 1 + ß 2 ß 1 (Xt ) ß 2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß 1 + ß 2 ß 1 (Xt ) ß 2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß 1 + ß 2 
Xt ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU) ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU) ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU)
ASPREADt-1 0.453** 0.205** 0.658** 0.615** -0.119 0.615** 0.919** -0.083* 0.836*
(0.045) (0.056) (0.073) (0.087) (0.028) (0.045)
USSPREADt -0.188 -0.050 - 0.840** -1.140** -0.300** 0.160 1.418* 1.418*
(0.138) (0.261) (0.307) (0.358) (0.156) (0.861)
LNDEBTGDPt -0.914 -0.317 - -1.103** 1.036** -0.068** 0.083 0.891** 0.891**
(0.572) (0.756) (0.438) (0.462) (0.151) (0.394)
ONOFFDIFt 0.150 -0.194 - 0.320 -1.573** -1.573** -0.044 0.179 -
(0.430) (0.499) (0.414) (0.478) (0.232) (0.256)
BIDASKDIFt -0.533* 1.851** 1.318* 3.488** -3.493** -0.004** 0.091 -0.136 -
(0.312) (0.477) (1.168) (1.302) (0.158) (0.184)
LNDEBTGDPt *USSPREADt 1.224* -0.004 1.224* 1.224** -1.187** 0.037** -0.178 -1.413 -
(0.641) (1.282) (0.500) (0.594) (0.180) (0.905)
ONOFFDIFt *USSPREADt -0.277 0.864 - -0.276 2.824** 2.824** 0.061 0.148 -
(0.492) (0.703) (0.378) (0.648) (0.219) (0.375)
BIDASKDIFt *USSPREADt 0.264 -3.155** -3.155** -0.416** 4.883** 4.467** -0.086 0.293 -
(0.317) (0.849) (0.126) (1.537) (0.171) (0.287)
γ γ γ 
DPREt 0.029 0.889** -0.874**
(0.159) (0.282) (0.371)
α α α
CONSTANT 0.211* -0.690** -0.049
(0.128) (0.270) (0.130)
Number of obs 1478 582 1489
F =   F(17,1460) = 260.39  F(17,564) = 106.83   F(17,1471) = 1191.19
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
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TABLE 6 (Continuation) 
NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL SPAIN
ß1 (Xt ) ß2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß1 + ß2 ß1 (Xt ) ß2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß1 + ß2 ß1 (Xt ) ß2 (DPREt *Xt ) ß1 + ß2 
Xt ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU) ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU) ß(EMU) ß(pre-EMU)
ASPREADt-1 0.217** 0.270** 0.487** 0.563** 0.259 0.822** 0.771** -0.199** 0.571**
(0.040) (0.059) (0.043) (0.054) (0.043) (0.059)
USSPREADt -0.171** 0.311** 0.140** 0.021 0.070 - -0.035 -0.365 -
(0.030) (0.154) (0.067) (0.113) (0.110) (0.264)
LNDEBTGDPt -0.855** 1.141** 0.286** 1.264** -1.055* 0.209* -0.326 -0.502 -
(0.174) (0.349) (0.507) (0.550) (0.438) (0.626)
ONOFFDIFt -0.182 -0.443 - 0.329 -0.416 - 0.094 -0.711** -0.711**
(0.336) (0.417) (0.213) (0.307) (0.194) (0.312)
BIDASKDIFt 0.520** -0.443** 0.077** 0.435** 0.830 0.435** 0.007 0.200 -
(0.254) (0.268) (0.158) (1.170) (0.139) (0.274)
LNDEBTGDPt *USSPREADt 0.988** -1.302** -0.315** -0.890 0.743 - 0.188 1.215 -
(0.196) (0.622) (0.572) (0.766) (0.520) (1.026)
ONOFFDIFt *USSPREADt 0.053 1.553** 1.553** -0.678** 0.876 -0.678** 0.011 1.247** 1.247**
(0.363) (0.650) (0.236) (0.553) (0.211) (0.507)
BIDASKDIFt *USSPREADt -0.423* 0.076 -0.423* -0.364** -3.046 -0.364** -0.007 0.000 -
(0.257) (0.346) (0.147) (2.728) (0.130) 0.000
γ γ γ 
DPREt -0.374** -0.180** 0.187
(0.089) (0.070) (0.154)
α α α
CONSTANT 0.265** 0.172** 0.126
(0.029) (0.058) (0.096)
Number of obs 1490 1323 1494
F =  F(17,1472) = 507.92   F(17,1305) = 384.66    F(17,1476) = 326.17
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
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